Constructivism is based on the principle that our personalities, behavior, and society are organized by the ways in which we attribute meanings to events, and act upon those meanings. It provides a philosophy, an epistemology, and methods that are especially congruent with the central values of social work, particularly client self-determination. In this volume, Dr. David D.V. Fisher introduces social workers to constructivism, a perspective which is becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences, and which has already been (...) embraced by clinical psychologists, communication researchers, and cyberneticians. Fisher explains constructivism as an epistemology, shows the consequences of adopting a constructivist epistemology in contrast to operating from within the traditional objectivist epistemology, demonstrates the ethical appropriateness and practicality of constructivism for social work, and explicates a number of specific applications of constructivism to social work. The book is divided into two parts. The first part consists of an introduction and then explains and expands the theory of constructivism and its relationship to social work. The second part shows how constructivist principles may be applied in social work practices. Constructivist principles are applied to selected aspects of assessment, intervention, and interviewing--using immediate experience as a guide to action and the creation of professional responsibility. An Introduction to Constructivism for Social Workers will be of particular interest to social workers and psychologists involved in theory and research. (shrink)

Identity, Morality, and Threat offers a critical examination of the social psychological processes that generate outgroup devaluation and ingroup glorification as the source of conflict. Daniel Rothbart and Karyna Korostelina bring together essays analyzing the causal relationship between escalating violence and opposing images of the Self and Other.

Edited proceedings of an interdisciplinary symposium on consciousness held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Includes a foreword by Freeman Dyson. Chapter authors: G. Vesey, R.L. Gregory, H.C. Longuet-Higgins, N.K. Humphrey, H.B. Barlow, D.M. MacKay, B.D. Josephson, M. Roth, V.S. Ramachandran, S. Padfield, and (editorial summary only) E. Noakes. A scanned pdf is available from this web site (philpapers.org), while alternative versions more suitable for copying text are available from https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/245189. -/- Page numbering convention for the pdf version (...) viewed in a pdf viewer is as follows: 'go to page n' accesses the pair of scanned pages 2n and 2n+1. Applicable licence: CC Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Each contributor to this book has used personal experience as the basis from which to frame his individual sociological perspectives. Because they have personalized their work, their accounts are real, and recognizable as having come from 'real' persons, about 'real' experiences. There are no objectively-distanced disembodied third person entities in these accounts. These writers are actual people whose stories will make you laugh, cry, think, and want to know more.

We prove that a form of the $Erd\H{o}s$ property (consistent with $V = L\lbrack H_{\omega_2}\rbrack$ and strictly weaker than the Weak Chang's Conjecture at ω1), together with Bounded Martin's Maximum implies that Woodin's principle $\psi_{AC}$ holds, and therefore 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. We also prove that $\psi_{AC}$ implies that every function $f: \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$ is bounded by some canonical function on a club and use this to produce a model of the Bounded Semiproper Forcing Axiom in which Bounded Martin's Maximum (...) fails. (shrink)

This chapter by Fisher continues the theme of the relation between Armstrong and Lewis, only Fisher casts the net far wider. He begins by arguing that there were at least two different lines of influence from early twentieth-century behaviourism to the identity theory: one through logical positivism and the other through ordinary language philosophy, the latter involving Place and Smart, and Lewis and Armstrong. It was Armstrong and Lewis who were to have a profound influence on subsequent developments (...) in analytic philosophy, both methodologically and in metaphysics, and it is for this reason that Fisher devotes the rest of his chapter to tracing the origins of their theories of mind and the manner in which the emphases and methodologies deployed in developing their respective theories became the hallmarks of their wider impact on analytic philosophy. (shrink)

v. 1 Making special relativity -- v. 2. Making general relativity -- v. 3. Physical science and the language of war -- v. 4. Quantum histories.

David Lewis is typically interpreted as a class nominalist. One consequence of class nominalism, which he embraced, is that the reduction of ordered pairs, triples, etc to unordered sets of sets is conventional. The reaction by his Australian counterparts D.M. Armstrong and Peter Forrest was that Lewis was not being ontologically serious. This chapter evaluates this debate over serious ontology. It is argued that in one sense Lewis is ontologically serious, but that his additional commitment to structuralism about classes (...) should push him to adopt a trope-theoretic account of naturalness, which opens up another way to respond to the charge of not doing serious ontology. This conclusion is supported by certain remarks he makes in his correspondence, thus revealing how his thinking about properties appears to have evolved from property-egalitarianism to a sparse theory of tropes. (shrink)

This article constitutes excerpts of a videotaped discussion hosted by the New England Journal of Medicine on January 14, 2008, concerning a range of topics on lethal injection prompted by the United States Supreme Court's January 7 oral arguments in Baze v. Rees. Dr. Atul Gawande moderated the roundtable that included two anesthesiologists - Dr. Robert Truog and Dr. David Waisel - as well as law professor Deborah Denno. The discussion focused on the drugs used in lethal injection executions, (...) whether physicians should participate, potential alternatives, and some of the legal parameters of Baze. (shrink)

David E. Fisher: Much Ado about (Practically) Nothing. A History of the Noble Gases Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10698-011-9114-0 Authors Sandra D. Hojniak, Department of Chemistry, Laboratory of Coordination Chemistry, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200F, 3001 Leuven, Belgium Journal Foundations of Chemistry Online ISSN 1572-8463 Print ISSN 1386-4238.

v. 1. Darwinism and politics ; The principles of state interference -- v. 2. Darwin and Hegel -- v. 3. Natural rights -- v. 4. Studies in political and social ethics ; Plato -- v. 5. Philosophical studies -- v. 6. Miscellaneous writings.

David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001) was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. He made significant contributions to almost every area of analytic philosophy including metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, and set the agenda for various debates in these areas which carry on to this day. In several respects he remains a contemporary figure, yet enough time has now passed for historians of philosophy to begin to study his place in twentieth (...) century thought. His philosophy was constructed and refined not just through his published writing, but also crucially through his life-long correspondence with fellow philosophers, including leading figures such as D.M. Armstrong, Saul Kripke, W.V. Quine, J.J.C. Smart, and Peter van Inwagen. His letters formed the undercurrent of his published work and became the medium through which he proposed many of his well-known theories and discussed a range of philosophical topics in depth. A selection of his vast correspondence over a 40-year period is presented here across two volumes. The letters offer an organic story of the origins, development, breadth, and depth of his philosophy in its historical context, as well as a glimpse into the influence of his many interlocutors."-- OCLC OLUC. (shrink)

Fondée sous les auspices du père de notre modernité philosophique Descartes, puis consolidée par des penseurs aussi importants que Leibniz, Bolzano ou Husserl, la mathesis universalis paraît représenter à elle seule l'ambitieux programme du « rationalisme classique ». Des philosophes tels que Husserl, Russell, Heidegger ou Cassirer ont pu s'accorder en ce point. Le développement de la « science moderne » aurait porté ce grand « rêve dogmatique » pour mener vers son terme le destin de la métaphysique occidentale. Pourtant (...) les recherches historiques récentes ont montré que l'idée de « mathématique universelle » existait bien avant Descartes, que ce dernier ne revendiquait d'ailleurs aucune rupture sur ce point et que sa réflexion se situait même assez clairement dans l'héritage des Anciens. Comment dès lors justifier que les Anciens, avec lesquels le programme des Classiques était censé rompre, aient pu déjà se préoccuper de « mathématique universelle »? Plus simplement encore, de quoi se préoccupaient donc ces philosophes sous ce concept? Le regain d'intérêt pour la mathesis universalis à la fin du XIXe siècle n'avait-il pas conduit paradoxalement à la perte de son sens comme problème? Cette étude a pour but de suivre ces questions jusqu'à leur origine et de montrer leur importance dans le dialogue entre mathématique et philosophie. Pages de début Remerciements Introduction La constitution de la « mathématique universelle » comme problème philosophique I. Aristote II. « Mathématique universelle » et théories mathématiques : Aristote, Euclide, Epinomis III. Le moment néo-platonicien Vers la science de l'ordre et de la mesure IV. La renaissance de la mathématique universelle V. La mathesis universalis cartésienne Conclusion Annexe I. La quaestio de scientia mathematica communi Annexe II. Essai bibliographique sur la mathesis universalis chez Descartes etLeibniz Bibliographie Index nominum Pages de fin. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a description of the good in health promotion based on an empirical study of health promotion practices in New South Wales, the most populous state in Australia. We found that practitioners were unified by a vision of the good in health promotion that had substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantively, the good in health promotion was teleological: it inhered in meliorism, an intention to promote health, which was understood holistically and situated in places and environments, a (...) commitment to primary rather than secondary prevention and engagement with communities more than individuals. Procedurally, the good in health promotion arose from qualities of practices that they developed over time in respectful relationships, were flexible and responsive to communities, built capabilities in communities and were sustainable. We discuss our findings with reference to Martha Nussbaum’s normative list of functional capabilities for a good human life, David Buchanan’s vision for health promotion ethics and common concerns in health promotion ethics regarding the relationship between paternalism and freedom. Our thick, vague conception of the good in health promotion, founded in the values and practical reason of people engaged daily in health promotion work, contributes to the development of a more complete theory of health promotion ethics. (shrink)

Rita Bottino,1 Santosh Nagaraju,2 Vikas Satyananda,2 Hidetaka Hara,2 Martin Wijkstrom,2 Massimo Trucco,1 David KC Cooper2 1Institute of Cellular Therapeutics, Allegheny Health Network, 2Thomas E Starzl Transplantation Institute, Department of Surgery, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA: Diabetes mellitus is increasing worldwide. Type 1 diabetes can be treated successfully by islet allotransplantation, the results of which are steadily improving. However, the number of islets that can be obtained from deceased human donors will never be sufficient to cure more than a (...) very small percentage of patients who might benefit from transplantation. Although there are some differences in glucose metabolism between pigs and humans, the use of pigs could provide an unlimited supply of islets, and the insulin produced would undoubtedly control glucose levels. Transplantation of islets into the portal vein results in islets residing in the liver; however, an early inflammatory response and rejection remain problematic, even when the recipient is receiving immunosuppressive therapy. In the long term, immunosuppressive drugs may exhibit toxicities to patients and specifically harm the islet cells. In contrast, encapsulation techniques provide islets with a physical barrier that prevents antibodies binding to the islet graft while still allowing insulin to be released into the recipient's circulation; in theory, patients receiving encapsulated grafts might not require exogenous immunosuppressive therapy. Nonhuman primates with encapsulated pig islet transplants have remained insulin-independent for several weeks, but long-term efficacy remains uncertain. Furthermore, techniques are now available to knock out genes from the pig and/or insert human genes, thus rendering the antigenic structure of pigs closer to that of humans, and providing protection from the human immune response. Islet transplantation from genetically engineered pigs has been followed by insulin independence in a small number of nonhuman primates for greater than 1 year. Neonatal islets have some advantages over adult islets in that they are easier to isolate and culture, and have the ability to proliferate during the first few months after transplantation. In 2009, the International Xenotransplantation Association set up a group to encourage and advise on clinical trials of pig islet xenotransplantation; this group's guidelines are discussed. Clinical trials of encapsulated pig islets are already under way. Keywords: diabetes, islets, pancreatic, pig, xenotransplantation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions THE UNITY OF WISDOM AND TEMPERANCE The attempt of Socrates to establish the unity of the virtues has long been an object of philosophic suspicion. Particular attention has been directed to the argument at Protagoras 332a-333b, in which Socrates seeks to demonstrate the unity of wisdom and temperance, by showing that they must be identified as the contrary of folly. The argument proceeds on the assumption (...) that wisdom and temperance are distinct, and so terminates in a contradiction between 'Whatever admits of a contrary admits of one only' and 'Folly, which is one thing, has two contraries, wisdom and temperance.' Scholars have generally rejected Socrates' proof of the second of the contradictory propositions. However, in a recent paper, Professor David Savan has claimed that the contradiction is derived in a formally valid way from premisses which either need no argument or are accepted by Protagoras} My intent in this paper is to cast doubt on this claim, and so to restore the status quo. According to the critics, the weak point in the argument is Socrates' defence of the statement 'Foolish acts and temperate acts are contraries.' But Saran holds that this statement follows from three conditionals, all stated by Socrates and accepted by Protagoras. These conditionals, referred to by Savan as F G and H, will here be termed P1-3. P1 If an act is right and advantageous, then it is temperate. Symbolically: (r.a) D t P2 If an act is wrong, then it is foolish. w~f P3 If an act is foolish, then it is not temperate. fD -t From these, Saran argues, "it follows that 'An act is right' and 'An act is temperate ' are truth functionallyequivalent, as are 'An act is wrong' and 'An act is foolish'.... Since right and wrong are either contraries or contradictories, temperate and foolish acts must also be either contraries or contradictories" (p. 24). Savan then argues that Protagoras, on the basis of his remarks earlier in the dialogue, must take right and wrong to be contradictories, so that temperate and foolish actions are also contradictories, rather than contraries. I want first to consider whether the material equivalences alleged to follow from P1-3 do in fact follow. They may be symbolized: Clr~t C2w =f It is immediately clear that neither C1 nor C2 follows from P1-3. But this is not surprising, because some expression of the relation between 'right' and 'wrong' 1D. Saran, "Socrates'Logic and the Unity of Wisdom and Temperance," in R. J. Butler (ed.), AnalyticalPhilosophy,2nd series(Oxford: BasilBlackwell,1965),pp. 20-26. [157] 158 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY must appear among the premises. Since Savan raises the question whether 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries or contradictories only after he claims to establish C1 and C2, we may suppose that the argument should hold whichever relation we assume. If 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries we add the premise: P4A r D --w And ifthey are contradictorieswe add the stronger premise: P4B r -- --w But neither C1 nor C2 follows from PI-3 together with either P4A or P4B. However, it may be urged, the argument fails only because 'advantageous' has been treated as an independent term. P1 should be replaced by: PI* r ~ t We now find that PI*-3 and P4B are sufficientto derive C1 and C2. But PI*-3 and P4A do not suffice.The most we can establish, using only P4A, is the disjunction : C1 vC2r -- t-v-w -- f And this is useless for the purposes of Socrates' argument. One further way of strengthening the premises might be suggested. Instead of dropping 'advantageous' from the argument, one might take it as related both to 'right' and to 'foolish.' That is, one might introduce additional premises from the pairs: P5A r ~ a P5B r - a and: P6A a D -f P6B a ---- -f P5A, added to P1-3 and P4B, will suffice for the derivation of C1 and C2. But no combination of premises not including P4B will do; from P1-3, P4A, P5B and P6B, one can derive C1 but not C2. It is, therefore, necessary to modify Savan's claim in two fairly important... (shrink)

This essay-a thesis accepted for the Cornell doctorate-consists of two parts, the first historical, the second expository and critical. Part I. traces the influences that led to the acceptance of a tripartite division of mind (intellect, feeling, will) in place of the older bipartite division. It also shows that Kant's original intention, in writing a third Critique, was to establish a priori principles of the new faculty of feeling; and argues that the combination of the Critiques of Taste and of (...) Teleology into a single Critique of Judgment was due to the fact that both alike were seen to centre round the idea of purposiveness. Part II indicates the need of mediation, formal and real, between the two Critiques of theoretical and of practical philosophy. The real opposition between them is to be found, primarily and chiefly, in the admission or rejection of the concept of freedom. By an elaborate analysis of Kant s theory of the beautiful, and a discussion of his use of the principle of teleology as applied to organic nature, the author is able to make it clear that the Critique of Judgment effects the desired real reconciliation. A concluding section suggests that Kant would have allowed objective validity to the teleological principle, had not the table of categories in the K. d. r. V. been already complete. -Mind [1898]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 161 2) You wish him to become what he is not, and no longer to be what he is now (literally: what he is now, no longer to be [283d 2-3]). 3) You wish for his death, since you wish him no longer to be (283d 5-6). The obvious way of dealing with this argument is to make precisely the distinction made by the author of (...) the Dissoi Logoi at V, 15: we should say to Dionysodorus, "Your conclusion that the friends of Cleinias wish for his death is the result of an illegitimate step: you went from 'you wish him not to be ignorant' to 'you wish him not to be'. To have made this step is to have ignored the distinction between existence with respect to some particular thing, i.e., ignorance, and existence in general." (A later critic might point out to Dionysodorus that he has confused the copulative and existential uses of the verb "to be.") It now becomes possible to return to the question, which of the two formulations, (a) or (b), does the author of the Dissoi Logoi presuppose? On the basis of the Euthydemus passage, it seems likely that he presupposed both. The conclusion of Dionysodorus' argument is (b), that Cleinias does not exist, but his conclusion is based upon (a) that Cleinias both is (ignorant) and is not (wise). The Euthydemus passage shows clearly that the words "if someone denies that the man exists" are considerably less of a non sequitur than might first appear. CONCLUSmN. The fallacy-solving distinction of Dissoi Logoi, u 15 was probably understood by Plato~ although not clearly formulated until Aristotle. How is this fact to be assimilated? Is the Dissoi Logoi (or at least this section) much later than has hitherto been presupposed? Or have scholars simply failed to credit its author with this important distinction? Until we have additional studies of the treatise, further discussion would be premature. ROSAMOND KENT SPRAGUE University o] South Carolina HUME'S A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN, A REVIEW NOTE In his biography of David Hume, E. C. Mossner notes that on May 21, 1745 there appeared in two Edinburgh newspapers the following advertisement: This Day will be published, and sold by the Booksellersin Town, A LETTER from a Gentlemanto his Friend at Edinburgh: containing some Observations on a Specimenof the PrinciplesconcerningRELIGION and MORALITY, said to be maintain 'd in a Booklately published,intituled, A Treatiseo] Human Nature, &c.I This Letter, Mossner discloses, was sent by David Hume to his friend Henry Home (later Lord Kames), and its publication was, he suggests, the "last 7A later passagein the Euthydemus, 293b ft.,in whichSocratesuses obstructive tactics when the sophistswish to movefrom "knowingx" to "knowingsimpliciter" seems to me to point in this direction.See R. K. Sprague,Plato's Use o] Fallacy (London, 1962),22-23, and passim on secundumquid. 1See The Li]e o] David Hume (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1954), pp. 153162,esp.p. 160. 162 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY frantic effort" by Hume's friends to stem the rising opposition to his appointment to the vacant chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University. Mossner was obliged to report further, however, not only that this effort had been in vain, but also that what "may well constitute an important document in the further interpretation of some aspects of the Treatise" has "never been located." z Now a copy of the Letter has been located. It was purchased from a Birmingham bookseller in December, 1966, by the National Library of Scotland. And, with admirable celerity, a facsimile edition of it has been published by the Edinburgh University Press. Adding still further to the value of this important discovery is the accompanying Introduction which describes the events, parties, and personalities which occasioned the Letter. The editors tell us that John Pringle first offered to resign his chair of philosophy in June, 1744, two years after he had taken leave to accept the position of Physician-General to the British forces in Flanders. He sent his offer to John Coutts, Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and Courts, in turn, suggested to Hume that he apply. Had Pringle not delayed... (shrink)

Critique of idealistic naturalism: methodological pollution in the main stream of American philosophy, by D. Riepe.--Ex nihilo nihil fit: philosophy's "starting point," by D. H. DeGrood.--An historical critique of empiricism, by J. E. Hansen.--Epilogue on Berkeley, by R. W. Sellars.--Mandala thinking, by A. Mackay.--An empirical conception of freedom, by E. D'Angelo.--Heidegger on the essence of truth, by M. Farber.--Minding as a material force, by H. L. Parsons.--The crisis of the 1890's and the shaping of twentieth century America, by R. B. (...) Carson.--Ideology, scientific philosophy, and Marxism, by J. Somerville.--Marx and critical scientific thought, by M. Marković.--Experimentalism extended to politics, by E. Guevara.--The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle, by V. J. McGill and W. T. Parry.--A need definition of "value," by R. Handy.--Alienation and social action, by A. Schaff.--Naturalism in the Tao of Confucius and Lao Tzu, by D. H.-F. Poe.--Bibliography (p. 260-269). (shrink)

L’Ariston dont il sera ici question est le péripatéticien né à Ioulis, dans l’Ile de Céos ; il vécut dans la seconde moitié du iiie siècle av. J.-C., et fut selon toute vraisemblance le successeur de Lycon de Troie, soit le quatrième successeur d’Aristote à la tête du Péripatos. Comme on le sait, il est difficile de faire le départ entre les textes qui lui reviennent (au moins des Erotika Homoia, un Lycon, et peut-être, selon Diogène Laërce, V, 64, un (...) recueil de vies de philosophes, en partic... (shrink)